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I. GEOGRAPHIC NORTH VERSUS MAGNETIC NORTJI TO PROVIDE ENUANCED
NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM SAFETY- Michael K. Larson, University of Nebraska at
Omaha
One of the most dramatic changes in aviation navigation is taking place as the groundbased VORis being replaced by the satellite-based GPS as the primary navigational facility in
the National Airspace System {NAS). The most recent Federal Radionavigation Plan (FRP)
proposes that by 2013 only a skeletal system ofVOR!DMEs will serve in a supponive role to the
GPS based enroute navigation system. The capabilities of GPS present many potential
enhancements to the efficacy and safety of the NAS. But, like many other high technology
aircraft and flight systems, GPS can add complexity and, thus, workload for pilots. A concerted
effort must be made to find means to simplifY pilot operations in order to avoid work-overload
conditions leading to loss of situational awareness.
One such proposal takes advantage of the simpler navigation operation procedures
provided by a Geographic Nonh based model versus the current Magnetic North based model.
GPS receivers automatically provide position with respect to longitude and latitude and motion
with respect to Geographic (Tru~) North along a Great Circle track. Thus. with the GPS and a
Geographic North based paradigm, procedures of converting true courses to magnetic headings
by applying wind correction angles, magnetic variations, and magnetic deviations are no longer
required. Additionally, magnetic disturbances and dip errors become irrelevant; and wind
correction angle compensation becomes unnecessary for intercepting/tracking procedures and
ATC vector.
II. WEATHER SAFETY TRAINING FOR GENERAL AVIATION PILOTS mROUGH
THE USE OF COMPUTER FLIGHT SIMULATION - David Widuaf, Utah State University
Flight into Instrument meteorological conditions is the leading cause of General Aviation
fatal accidents. This has been a persistent trend over many years. This proposal offers a
possible solution to reduce these fatal accidents. Indicated in the proposal is the use of
Computer-Based Training (CBT) through existing Personal Computer Aviation Training
Devices (PC-ATO). These PC simulators would be used to develop hands-on training scenarios
for beginning pilots and recurrent training for experienced pilots. Pilots would be placed in
simulated weather conditions they would not normally see and evaluate and improve their
reactions to these scenarios. The conceptual design of this study is presented for expert
participation in the conceptualization of research phase.

m. IDENTIFICATION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
SAFETY ISSUES- Chien-tsung Lu, University of Nebraska at Omaha
During the past few decades. the Federal Aviation Administration, the National
Transponation Safety Board, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, aircraft
manufacturers, and other safety advocate groups have conducted numerous research projects on
the topic of human behavior. The majority of the research conducted was related to flight crew
behavior. The main purpose of this project is to focus on human behavior issues related to
maintenance technicians. The selected methodology, a survey, will be administered to
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maintenance personnel and the results analyzed to identity needs for future human factors
training.

IV. DISASTER PREPAREDNESS, EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND CURRICULUM
DEVELOPMENT- Michaela Schaaf and Brent Bowen, University of Nebraska at Omaha
Curriculum development can be achieved through the application of the research model.
A new upper-level aviation course at the University ofNebraska at Omaha followed such a plan.
The course, Airpon Safety and Security, was conceived following the crash of TWA 800 and the
subseq•Jent White House Commission and the growing awareness of emergency planning and
disaster response in aviation. The course was developed utilizing research into the curriculum
needs in this area, including discussions ,,.,ith industry and government expens. The results of
this research revealed components for inclusion, such as airpon and ramp safety, OSHA
requirements, risk assessment and management, disaster preparedness, emergency response
plans, coordination among authorities, crisis communication, and passenger rights. The research
also revealed that the structure of such a course lends itself to a seminar format and required
many areas of expertise.

V. THE COLLEGIATE AVIATION EMERGENCY RESPONSE CHECKLIST:
FUNDAMENTAL PRE-CRISIS PLANNING- Mary Fink and Michael Larson, University of
Nebraska at Omaha
The University ofNebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute's commitment to the provision
of a safe learning environment both in the classroom and in the air has led to the creation and
adoption of an Emergency Response Checklist to be utilized in the event that a flight student is
involved in an aircraft accident or incident. The plan came to fruition as the result ofbest
practices research which examined crisis management plans at several regional flight training
providers. Four Midwestern universities with aviation programs and one Air Force flying club
were polled regarding current crisis procedures. At the time of the initial study, only one of the
flight training providers possessed a crisis response plan. This plan outlines the roles of the flight
vendor, as well as those of University ofNebraska at Omaha Campus Security, Student Affairs,
University Relations, and the Aviation Institute. The goal oftrus plan is to eliminate uncenainty
and assure that emergencies are responded to in an efficient manner with a clear and open flow
of communication among all designated channels. As a result of this study, the Aviation Institute
has implemented its own Emergency Response Checklist with all applicable university channels
and contracted flight vendors. The outline of the checklist will be provided for review, comment
and potential adoption by collegiate aviation flight training programs.
VI. SYSTEMIC INITIATIVES IN AVIATION SAFETY RESEARCH- Brent D. Bowen,
University ofNebraska at Omaha
The scope of need in aviation safety research is daunting. Whenever we learn of tragedy
we consider if. through enhanced knowledge, we could prevent another loss. At the University of
Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute, a key tenet in our mission "advocates the development of
improved aviation/aerospace systems while funhering their integration into the overall modal
transponation architecture." Toward this charge, the enhancement of systemic safety in aviation
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is a priority in the research directions undertaken. A review of the several ongoing aviation
safety research projects at the Aviation Institute are presented and discussed in the interest of
identifying collaboration opportunities. Integration of collegiate aviation resources in the area of
safety education and research development wili result in safety enhancements for the overall air
transportation system.
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Dr. Brent Bowen is the University of Nebraska Foundation Distinguished Professor in Aviation.
He serves as Director for the Aviation Institute and as Director of Aviation and Transportation
Policy and Research at the University ofNebraska at Omaha. Additionally, Dr. Bowen is the
program director and principal investigator for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration funded by the Nebraska Space Grant Consortium and NASA EPSCoR Program.
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forecasting.
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Transport Pilot Airplane Single and Multi-engine Land and Airplane Single Engine Sea Certified
Flight Instructor (Gold Seal/ASEUASES/AMEL/Tnstrument) Flight Engineer (Turbojet
Powered) FAA Safety Counselor. His research interests include GPS systems within the
National Airspace System framework, safety research on in-flight severe weather encounters,
and policy research to update federal air regulations for modem pc-based simulation in pilot
training and technological innovation in the National Airspace System.
Chien-tsung Lu is a doctoral research assistant at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. He
attained his MS degree in Aviation Safety from Central Missouri State University. He is an FAA
certified aviation technician and Federal Communication Commission (FCC) licensee. He is
currently pursuing
Doctorate of Public Administration degree with an area of specialization
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in Aviation Administration. Mr. Lu's research interests are in the areas of airline maintenance
safety management, accident investigation and prevention, human behavior and safety, aircraft
cabin safety and training, and public policy.
Mrs. Michaela Schaaf is Instructor of Aviation and Senior Research Associate at the UNO
Aviation Institute. She holds a Master of Science degree, Aviation Concentration, from the
University ofNebra:ika at Omaha where she is presently working toward a Doctorate in Public
Administration with an Area of Specialization in Aviation Administration. Mrs. Schaaf is also
pursing a Certificate in Aviation Safety and Security Management from The George Washington
University. Her Federal Aviation Administration certificates include Private Pilot and Basic
Ground Instructor. Additionally, Mrs. Schaaf serves as Assistant Director of the NASA
Nebraska Space GTant Program. She is a member of Women in Aviation, International; Council
on Aviation Accreditation; University Aviatiot; Association; American Society for Public
Administration; Omicron Delta Kappa; Alpha Eta Rho; and Civil Air Patrol . Her research
interests are in the areas of aviation security, curriculum development, program evaluation, and
women in aviation.
Dr. David P. Widauf is the Aviation Program Coordinator and Associate Professor of
Industrial Technology in the College of Engineering at Utah State University. He received his
Doctorate in Industrial Technology from Texas A&M University, his M.A. in Educational
Administration from Pepperdine University, and his B.S. in Aeronautical Engineering/Industrial
Technology from California Polytechnic State University. He is a former Technical Engineering
Program Manager and Project Engineer forE-Systems Inc. and Squadron Navigator for the U.S.
Air Force. As a Colonel in the Air Force Reserve, Dr. Widauf serves at Hill AFB. He currently
is teaching classes in Aviation Science, Aerodynamics, Composite Materials, and Aircraft
Systems. His research has included developing, manufacturing and successfully testing a
composite nose cone for the "Bow Shock" project for the Utah State Space Dynamics
Laboratory. He is a co-principal investigator on a remote sensing research aircraft platform for
the Rocky Mountain Space Grant Consortium.
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Abstract
The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) current Federal Aviation Regulations
(F ARs) do not explicitly require Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) training.
Whilst the benefits ofMRM training, which originated in human factors researches, have
been !":':Ognized by the air industry and its mandatory implementation has been regulated
by many aviation authorities such as those of Canada, United Kingdom, and European
Union (EU) countries, the FAA in the United States retains its non-regulation stance
This situation has raised both curiosity and a research anxiety to discover the rationale
underpinning such decision making. This white paper aims to explore related docum::.nts,
up-to-date evidence and real-world perspectives in relation to MRM training.
Consequently, the authors hope to generate research propositions and tentative theories
for future policy study.

13

3

Introduction

Aviation safety issues are always at the forefront of pub Iic concerns. The American
flying public has appreciated the development of technology in favor of modernizing
civil air transportation since the passage of Airline Deregulation Act in I 978. After
deregulation, the government's legislative attempt in enhancing aviation safety and
revitalizing civil aviation -the public experienced more efficient, comfortable, and
competent air transportation. However, people have also been continuously demanding a
safer, accident-free aviation environment. Therefore promoting aviation safety has
become one of the top priorities for the government and air carriers. Unfortunately, the
potential for aviation accidents still threatens us.
Historically, pilot error has contributed the majority of aviation accidents (Boeing,
2000). The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has conducted
human factors research that aims to cure flight deficiency-pilot errors (Orlady & Orlady,
1999). Since the early 1970s, NASA human factors researchers have developed the Crew
Resource Management (CRM) training as response to this. Since then, CRM has been an
important safety training for pilot, which aims to taper pilot error. As a matter of fact ,
since United Airlines (UA) initially launched its voluntary implementation of Crew
Resource Management (CRM) in 1981, pilot error-related accidents have been
reducedl981 (Mudge, 1998; Lu, 2001). NASA' s successful human factors experiments
and knowledge implementations in airlines have later lead to another important system of
training- in this case, for AMTs- called maintenance resource management (MRM),
which came about in late 1980s.
After UA's successful application ofCRM, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). in 1990, mandated Crew Resource Management (CRM) for all airline pilot
(Aviation Supplies & Academics [ASA], 200la) in addition to the existing regulations
regulating pilot qualifications, operations, and activities (i .e., medical standards, night
rules, standardized operations, and training). The mandatory implementation of CRM by
regulation aimed to ensure the reduction of pilot errors for the entire air industry (United
States Government Printing Office [US GPO], 1990). Meanwhile, MRM training also
attempted to prevent maintenance errors since its birth and the results have been
positively confirmed by the air industry and FAA itself (Lavitt, 1995). Interestingly, the
FAA has not attempted to regulate MRM for maintenance personnel, while the public,
academia, and the FAA itself have considered the MRM training as the vital role in
promoting maintenance safety.
A review ofFAA FARs reveals the fact that there is no regulation·mandating any
safety trainings for AMTs. This situation does not mean that safety trainings for the
AMTs are not necessary. In fact, it generates policy controversy that needs to be
discovered for academia researchers.

.14
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The FAA has contributed a new Advisory Circular (AC) I 2 I -SOD as a guideline of
safety training for both pilots and AMTs. Yet, AC 121-SOD mainly illustrates the
guidelines for pilot CRM and partially mentions the concepts of MRM training (FAA,
200 I). Even though the FAA has been circulating the AC 120-S I D to the air industry, the
nature of AC is not mandatory. AC is a document that is in an advice or encouraging
fashion. However, without a legitimacy platform championing MRM training, the
airlines' training regularity and willingness are both skeptical (Brackbill, 1994).
This white paper aims to explore the reasons behind the missing part of the FAA
FARs in terms ofthe MRM training for AMTs. Why is it rational without regulating
MRM? Is there any alternative to promote MRM instead of proposing regulations?
Background
After the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the nature of laissez-faire
and free competition has forced airlines to further promote, or at least maintain air safety
in order to compete with business rivals and survive (Chang, 1986). As Chang ( 1986)
particularly stated in relation to safety training about Pacific market, the financial
condition was primarily considered by airlines. For small airlines, the safety training
could not be ensured without a strong financial support (Rose, 1992).
Meanwhile, airlines have tried to provide low-airfare products in order to attract
more passengers and, ultimately, to survive in the Darwinian post-deregulation
battlefield. Yet, providing both high safety level and low-fare air transportation seems
paradoxical. Aviation safety researchers have already pinpointed the negative impact
from deregulation and market competition on overall aviation safety (Kucinski, 1990; De
Jager, 1993 ). Both Kucinski and De Jager stated that the passage of airl.ine deregulation
act not only shaped the current business ecology of air transportation in the United States,
but also led to the substantial reduction of training cost (Brackbill, 1994). In particular,
the cost of safety training and surveillance was typically dwindled if the airlines
encountered a constrained operational budget (Kucinski, 1990; De Jager, 1993). They
further argued the logic of this cost reduction phenomenon by revealing that the airlines
tend to meet the basic safety requirements regulated by the FAA. In addition to this, it
was found that by reducing operational cost, the airlines could possibly provide lower
airfare for passengers, increase load factor, gain more revenue, and therefore survive. The
Consumer Reports Travel Letter in 1997 outlined that it is highly suspicious that low-cost
airlines can operate to a uniformly safety standard in the U.S. ( 1997 March)
The FAA's Dual Mandates- an Ambiguous

Schem~

The public's concern with aviation safety has forced the government to pass related
public laws and constantly inspect airline safety performance. The FAA has been in
charge of air transportation affairs since its birth in 1967 (Rollo, 2000). On the one hand,
the FAA should foster and encourage civil air commerce. On the other, the FAA also has
to audit and promote aviation safety performance (Adamski & Doyle, 1995; Rollo, 2000).
Yet, this "dual-mandate" responsibility has resulted in the FAA's insufficient ability in
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safety surveillance (Nader & Smith, 1994). Consequently. the FAA's lack of
effectiveness in safety inspection has been continuously criticized by the public
(Connelly, 2001) as well as by the government itself(Stout, 1999, Dec. 2; Cannady,
200l;Filler,2001 July It).
The Traditional Pilot-oriented Aviation

~.:ru:~

According to an annual report from Boeing, "Worldwide Commercial Jet Airplane
Accidents," in 2000, cockpit crew error was the primary factor causing accidents
(Boeing, 2000). Between 1991 and 2000, pilot error had contributed to around 66% of the
accidents in the entire commercial aviation business. In the same report, the Boeing
Company indicated that it was worse between 1959 and 2000 (68.3%), which meant pilot
error remained high when compared with the other causalities. Yet, we must notice that
more than 5% of commercial aviation accidents resulted from maintenance-related
problems (Boeing, 2000). Concerning the goal of government's zero-accident proposal,
5% is too big to be Ignored. MRM training is not yet regulated by the FAA. There are
more than 5% overall aviation accidents caused by the mistakes of ground maintenance
personnel (Boeing, 2000). For a persuasive evidence, the following headlined
maintenance-error related mishaps (See Table 2) can be seen as an urgent warning signal
to the air industry and government that indicates maintenance safety should be treated as
significant before similar accidents happen again.
Table 2
MI dM'IS haos
amtenance E rror Retate
Airlines/ model
Maintenance
Date

Cause

Error
5125179

American Airlines I
DC-10
Japan Airlines I
B-747
Aloha Airlines/B737
United Airlines I
DC-10
Alaska I MD-82

·-

Fa tali
_!y_

Engine separation due to
flawed maintenance
Improper bulkhead
Yes
8112185
maintenance
Yes
Inadequate maintenance of
04128/88
aged fuselage
Yes
Improper NDT maintenance
7/19/89
of #2 engine turbine blades
Yes
Improper maintenance of
01/31/00
jackscrew
In-flight
break-up (parts of
11112/01
American Airlines I Under
investigation
rudder and engines}
A-300
Resources: Data retneved from the Nattonal Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
Accident and Incident database on-line [Retrieved on Sep. 22, 200 I) and Dr. Shari
Stamford Krause ( 1996), "Aircraft safety - accident investigations, analyses, &
applications."
Yes

16

272
524
I
Ill

88
265
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Purposes of Study
The main goal of this project is twofold. First, locate the significant views of the
internal and external dynamic variables of human factors influencing aircraft
maintenance and flight performance. Second, conduct an in-depth analysis and
comparison in relation to MRM education and seek to yield a detailed understanding of
current training scenarios and regulations across important aviation countries.

Despite the development of human factors and MRM education in aircraft
maintenance field in the 1990s, ironically, many current working AMTs are not well
educated in MRM, which could ultimately jeopardize aviation safety. Academia cannot
overemphasize the importance of aviation safety research and should continuously
explore the ways to strengthen it. Because there is no regulation of MRM, this white
paper will primarily seek to discover the rationale behind this decision, fulfill the
knowledge deficit for the purpose of promoting aviation maintenance and airline safety,
and overarch the regulatory gap if possible.
Review of Literat11res
After the fatal accident of Alaska Airlines Flight 261 in January 2000, caused by a
flawed jackscrew maintenance and rushed inspection (Fiorino, 2001 ), many aviation
experts have been boldly informed that the zero-accident cannot be achieved by focusing
on flight safety only . The maintenance safety also plays a significant role in supporting
aviation safety. The tasks of preventing flawed aircraft maintenance could not be
overemphasized as well.
Jdentifying the Human Factors Affecting Maintenance Performance
Commercial airplanes are recognized as some of the most inspected and maintained
transportation equipment in the world. The main purpose of aircraft maintenance is to
keep aircraft remaining airworthy (King, 1986). The major components of an airplane,
such as flaps, ailerons, rudder, engines, landing gears, and fuselage are inspected closely
by aircraft technicians following standardized operation proc.edures (SOPs). Normally,
airlines or fixed base operators (FBOs) produce their own standardized maintenance
manuals approved by the FAA based on the original maintenance manuals provided by
the manufacturers (Richardson, Rodwell, & Baty, 1995). Whether an aircraft is airworthy
or should be retained for further detailed inspections is recommended by qualified
maintenance personnel- the FAA certified AMTs (Delp, Watkins, & Kroes, 1994).
Typically, airline maintenance tasks arc initially categorized into four routine
checks, from A-check to D-check, as well as timed on an hourly to annual basis (King,
1986). Often, aircraft mechanics must remove access panels to closely and accurately
inspect critical components, such as the electrical wiring, hydraulic system, cables, and
look for severe corrosion in remote areas. In particular, when conducting a D-check
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inspection - a detailed inspection and replacement of thousands of critical parts (such as
engine bearings, engine blades, and o-rings)- must be accomplished in order to restore
the compatible strength and usability of an aircraft (Butterworth-Hayes, 1997). Most
importantly from the airline management perspective, each stage of aircraft maintenance
should be efficiently and effectively completed for the shortest "on-the-ground" time and
the highest amount of possible revenue-generating services.
Aircraft maintenance is quite challenging and intense. Therefore, human factors
affecting job performance should be scrutinized. A survey conducted by Boeing
Company and other safety researchers revealed the elements mainly contributing to AMT
mistakes as the following: 1) boredom; 2) failure to understand instructions well; 3)
rushing; 4) pressure from management; 5) fatigue; 6) distractions at critical time; 7) shift
work; 8) poor communication; 9) use of incorrect parts and tools; and I 0) unauthorized
maintenance proceedings (Al-Aimoudi, 1998; Taylor & Christensen, 1998). Wood ( 1997)
and Drury (1999 & 2001) further argued the major problems of AMTs when conducting
aircraft maintenance/inspection (See Table 3}, and asserted that AMTs make mistakes
and they are not error-free per se.
Table 3
~ical

Aircraft Maintenance Jnsoection Problems
--·
I. Fatigue and error- Awkward postures due to restricted spaces and unsuitable support
stands leading to postural fatigue and errors.
2. Physical Impediment - Heavy and awkward lifting and movement of components,
particularly around structural obstructions. This leads to component and structural
damage, as well as to soft tissue injuries.
3. Biomechanics - Controls on access equipment, such as cherry pickers, which do not
follow good human factors practice. Such poor control design often results in contact
between the equipment and the aircraft structure.
4. Foreign Object Damage- Lack of tool counting and check-off procedures allowing for
the potential of leaving tools inside structures when work is complete_
5. Ignorance- Lack of conspicuous visual indicators of correct closure leading to failure
to close access hatches completely after maintenance.
6. Misconduction- Adopting incorrect instructions/tools or insufficient instructions/tools
that leads to unairworthy_ condition and consequently costs more to restore.
7. Overlook- Failure to target critical/remote parts, equipments, or corrosion that
requires replacement and repair.
Resources: R1chard Wood (1997), AvwtiOfl sa(etyprograms. Cohoe G. Drury (200 I,
October 2), "Establishing a Human Factors/Ergonomics program" and Human factor.'l in
aviation maintenance ( J999).
Without a doubt, because of its task complexity, physical and mental requirements
(i.e., personal awareness, stress, situation habituation, rest, fatigue, and health), and tense
working climate (i.e., shift work, managerial pressure, working efficiency, interpersonal
communication, and external sociological influences), the maintenance issues contrasted
with so-called human factors aspects are highly identical to those that affect flight
performance. In particular, we should pay more attention to social and psychological
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problems, because, although they cannot be easily sensed or visualized, they are
influencing AMTs' decision making on a daily basis (Courchaine & Loucka, 1995;
Hoffman, Granhag, Kwong, Sheree, & Loftus, 2001 April). The AMTs' working
situation should be examined closely when considering the relationship between their
health and job performance. In addition, the FAA does not require an AMT to hold an
official medical certificate as like pilots. Apart from the routine medical test for alcohol
and drug abuse regulated by the FAR Part 65.12 and 65.23 (ASA, 200Jb), there is no
required federal medical certificate for AMTs.
The Advantage of Maintenance Resource Management (MRM)
Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) training has been considered to be one
of the cures for maintenance errors (Lavitt, 1995; Mudge, 1998). MRM was initially
developed based on the experimental findings of human factors knowledge observed by
NASA in the early 1970s. Human factors is a study concerning the interaction between
human and software (S), hardware (H), environment (E), and liveware (L), which is socalled the "SHEL" model in aviation safety (see Table 4) (Krause, 1996). The interfaces
between active elements (S.H.E.L.) and human beings constitute the framework of
interactions and working performance.
Table4
- "SHEL" Model

Human

Performance

Environment
Resources: Krause, S. S. (1996): "A ireraft safety- accident investigation.'i, ana/y.w!s, &
application.'i" and Federal Aviation Administration. (2000, December 30): "Sy.\·tem .w~fety
handbook: practices and guidelines for conducting system safety engineering and
management".
Likewise, human factors is an analytical science of the factors influencing human
performance and consequently seeks to eliminate or dilute the negative impact from an
explicit safety factor (Orlady & Orlady, 1999). Furthermore, human factors is scientific
research regarding human-centered activities. Nonnally, it is the science of exploring
human-centered activities that includes the research of human's inner and outer
capabilities and limitations, and the adaptation to the change of environment (Koonce,
1999; Orlady & Orlady, 1999). Because the human factor s concepts are underpinning the
MR.M training, the primary purpose of launching MRM training for the AMTs is to
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restore an AMT's performing compatibility, self-awareness, interpersonal
communication, and effectiveness of resource usage.
Docs safety training (CRM and MRM) help? Capitelli (1988) conducted
longitudinal research across three major airlines regarding the relationship between the
duration of airline maintenance safety training and the maintenance related violations. He
discovered that the less training received by airline maintenance technicians, the more
violations filed against maintenance could occur. ln the contemporary aircraft
maintenance field, MRM training primarily seeks to reduce maintenance flaws and
aviation accidents by heightening the level of self-awareness and interpersonal
communication. In other words, MRM training has gained its deserved currency from the
air industry (Lavitt, 1995).
Advisory Circular (AC) 120-51
Certainly, the FAA had contributed significant effort to the development of
maintenance resource management rooted in the research playground of human factors.
In order to propose a framework ofMRM training for the air industry, the FAA issued
Advisory Circular (AC) 120-5 J A in 1992 (FAA, 1992), 120-51 B in 1997 (FAA, 1997),
J20-51 C in 1998 (FAA, 1998), and 120-51 D in 200 I (FAA, 2001) to cope with human
factors such as situational awareness, leadership, communication skills, teamwork, and
decision making that directly affected aviators. The FAA's suggested training curriculum
topics in AC 120-5 JD involve two major sectors: (a) communications process and
decision behavior; and (b) team building and maintenance. The first sector contains
. suggested trainings in open communication, conflict resolution, situational awareness,
evaluation, and recognition, and group decision making. The second recommended sector
includes the trainings of leadership and followership, interpersonal dynamics,
management climate, workload management, preparation and vigilance, distraction
avoidance, and stress reduction (FAA, 2001 May). The federal regulations in light of the
implementation of the newly issued AC 120-51 D are listed in FAR Part 121 and Part 13 5
for all flight crews, dispatchers and flight attendants. As stated in FAR Part 121-419(b ),
initial ground training must contain the following programmed hours of safety
instruction: I) Group J airplanes- reciprocating powered (64 hours) and turbopropeller
powered (80 hours), and 2) Group II airplanes (120 hours) oftraining for pilots and flight
engineers. The regulated hours of human factors training for flight attendants are from
four (4) to twenty hours while the DRM training hours for dispatchers are from 30 to 40,
which depends on the category of air service (ASA, 2001a).
Joint Aviation Regulation (JAR) and Canadian Aviation Regulation (CAR)
As stated by the JAA in 2001, "the FAA has decided to focus on research,
publication of guidance material and the promotion of Human Factors Programmes
without changing the regulatory framework" (JAA, 2001, p.5). In other words, the FAA
does not attempt to regulate MRM at the present time. In Europe, the Joint Aviation
Authority (JAA) has regulated such safety training for aircraft technicians since June I,
1998. Addressed in the JAR Part 66, an aircraft engineering candidate should be tested
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regarding the knowledge of maintenance human factors and a detailed or itemized
examination should be otherwise discussed. The knowledge requirement of maintenance
human factors is to enhance a technician's situation awareness, mental consciousness,
interpersonal communication, and ongoing self-evaluation (JAA, 2001). In Canada, the
Transportation Canadian, the aviation authority in Canada, has also regulated the similar
safety training in Canadian Aviation Regulation (CAR) Part V, "Airworthiness Manual
Chapter 566-13," since August 1998 (Transport Canada, 2001, December 12). As
outlined in this chapter, an aircraft maintenance candidate should be able to apply
occupational health and safety practices and explain how human factors contribute to
maintenance errors (Transport Canada, 200 I, December 12). The regulatory requirement
issued by the JAA and Transport Canada has forced the maintenance training schools
within the European Union (EU) and Canadian territories to embed human factors
training for student aircraft technicians.
The FAA's fundamental training requirement for an AMT listed in FAR Part
147.21 is 1,900 hours (400 hours general, 750 hours airframe, and 750 powerplant)
(United States Government Printing Office [US GPO], 2001, November 18). Each
training section is basically divided into three subsections for a total of nine (9)'
subsections. The aircraft knowledge and practice skills portion of technician training
should contain general, airframe, and powerplant sections oftraining listed in FAR Part
147 Appendix B, C, and D. Table 6 illustrates a typical training curriculum for the FAA
Part 147 technician school.
Table 6
.. T rammg
.. Sllb
. d stetes
The T.vntca
. I Ai rcra ftT echnictan
;yJ a us m t t1e u mte
Basic electricity, aircraft drawing, weight and balance, tubing and fitting,
General
Training
ground eperation, material and process, mathematics, physiGs, corrosion
control, form and record, maintenance publications, and mechanic
privileges and limitations.
Airframe
Wood structure, aircraft covering and finishing, sheet metal and nonmetallic structure, welding, assembly and rigging, airframe inspection,
Training
landing system. hydraulic and pneumatic system, cabin atmosphere control,
aircraft instrument system, navigation and radio communication, i'tlel
system, electrical system, position warning system, ice and rain control,
and fire protection system.
Powerplant Powerplant theory and maintenance, reciprocating engine, turbine engines,
Training
engine inspection, engine instrument system, engine fire protection system,
engine electrical system, lubrication system, ignition and staring system,
fuel metering system, engine fueling system, induction ad airflow sy.;tern,
engine cooling system, exhaust and reverser system, propellers, unducted
fans, and auxiliary _!)_Ower unit.
Resource: FAA FAR Partl47 Appendtx B. C and D.
Without a douot, there is no regulation ofMRM training, human factors, or related safety
classes in the syllabus for student AMTs during their stay in maintenance training
schools.
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However, in Europe, after June I, 1998, in addition to the avionic training and
understanding of legislation, the new revised training modular syllabus ofthe JAA's JAR
Pan 66, "knowledge requirements," has enforced the maintenance human factors to be
tested (Federal Office for Civil Aviation [FOCA], 2001 May). Swiss FOCA reflected this
policy change and categorized the training syllabus for this aircraft maintenance license
(AML) into 17 training modules (see Table 7):
Table 7
JAR-66 AML Training Modules
Aviation 1eBislation
Module 10
Mathematics
Module I
Module2
Physics
Module 11
Aeroplane systems (Mechanical)
Module 3
Electrical fundamentals
Module 12
Helicopter systems (Mechanical)
Module 4
Aircraft systems (Avionic)
Electronic fundamentals
Module 13
Digital techniques
Module 14
Prol'_ulsion (Avionic)
Module 5
Module 15
Turbine engine
Module 6
Material & hardware
Module 7
Maintenance practices
Module 16
Piston engine
Module 8
Basic aerodynamics
Module 17
Propellers
Module9
Human factors
Module 18
Reserved
Resource: Swiss Federal Office for Cwil Aviation [FOCA]. (2001 May), Conversion of a
Swiss Licence to a restricted or full JAR-66 aircraft maintenance licence (AML).
The cross-reference between JAR and FAR implies that the insertion ofMRM or
human factors education to the existing training program seems reasonable. However,
from Maddox's angle, both current minimum duration of overall AMT training ( 1900
hours) and tuition would be increased. Will it erode one's willingness to become an
aircraft technician? The shortage of AMTs in aviation industry has been a serious
problem and the shortage keeps expanding (Phillips & Taverna, 2001). This situation is
not only negatively affecting maintenance operations, but will literally slash the quality
of maintenance.
The Relationship Between Regulation and Safety
Mudge (1998) argued that without a solid law regulating specific human operation
in relation to the MRM in aircraft maintenance, the decision making of human beings
will be by no means flawless. Especially, he argued that personal capability of making
correct decision will be shrunken when one is immersed in a highly stressful environment
or under heavy workload. He further argued that in aviation safety training, without
regulations, human reactions to any ongoing abnormal situations in lieu of a standardized
procedure will tend to revert back to the original skills because they feel more
comfort?.ble to apply. In other words, AMTs will act just as they would have prior to any
safety training. It is called the law of primary in psychology (Mudge, 1998). As the FAA
itselfreported in AC 120-SlD 7e, "when there is no effective reinforcement .. .by way of
recurrent training, improvements in attitudes observed after initial indoctrination tent to
disappear, and individuals' attitudes tend to revert to former levels" (FAA, 2001 ). The
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safety training will be in vain provided there is no official regulation associated with it
for the obligatory recurrent safety trainings.
The study ofLofaro and Smith (1998) in this area stated that the FAA's regulations
are only the minimum standards for flight operation and maintenance performance.
Although the airlines always commit to exceed the marginal criteria for the sake of
passenger safety and company reputation, maintaining the above-standard safety
performance can only happen when an air carrier's finance is healthy (Lofaro and Smith,
1998). They argued that "when any air carrier is in financial trouble" or wants to
maximize its profit, "there are only a few ways open to cut costs: reduce the quality and
training ofboth flight crew and mechanics, reduce the quality of the maintenance and
outsource all you can" (Lofaro and Smith, 1998, p.213). If the airlines seek to cut training
costs, they will cut the items related to maintenance people such as MRM. It is legal not
to conduct MRM training for AMTs. Yet it violates the federal regulation provided the
regulated CRM for the flight crews is absent. Even though the airlines are in a stable
financial condition, based on the regulation, they are legally allowed not to spend
resources in MRM training and still meet the FAA safety requirements.
Because the F ARs do not contain an explicit regulation of human factors or related
training for AMTs, many non-profit organizations, such as the Air Transport Association
(AT A) and Natiomll Air Transportation Association (NAT A) have called for an initial
revision of AMT licensing procedures (Maddox, 2001).
Research Propositions
Executive Order 12866 and 13132 were issued to direct federal agencies to assess
economic impact and cost analysis on state and local government. The Regulatory
Flexibility Act of 1980 was passed to reinforce stakeholders collecting public voice
before proposing a policy or regulation (Filler, 2001 July 11). However, regardless ofthe
mandated guidelines of the Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13132, and the
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, FAA's operation is also pulled by various
administrative actors such as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), segmented
federal cabinets, and industry lobbyists (Filler, 2001 July 11). The administrator's role
should be that of a facilitator who politically integrates "administrative conservatorship"
in an organization as Terry (1995, p. XX) depicted. Administrators should retain a role of
conservator, who should filter and control the external influence upon organizations
(Terry, 1995). In addition, the function of a public administrator should remain in
"balance wheel" fashion as argued by Rohr ( 1986, p. 182) - people who pamper
legislative power, judicial surveillance and public needs (Rohr, 1986).
It is understandable that public agencies have been placed in the center of the
political vortex. Hence, decision making is never simple or linear within this irontriangle. It is a battlefield; plural-value competitions are underway. The merits of
arguments should thus contain the following multi-dimensional research aspects: What's
the rationale not to regulate MRM by the government? What is the nature of the FAA's
policy making? What human factors affect AMT performance? What is the airlines'
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attitude in conducting non-regulatory MRM training? Should we need to regulate MRM?
Are there any alternatives for MRM? Do we need to revise the initial technician training
syllabus? If so, can we revise the technician training syllabus without adding more
training hours? If the answer is no, what is the current AMT' s reaction to an obligatory
MRM? Is it costly to conduct MRM training? What is the true relationship between
MRM training and safety performance?
Conclusion
While the global aviation industry works closely to strike for a zero-accident
operational climate by recruiting MRtvf or related training as an initial safety training for
aircraft technicians, the FAA's reluctance in relation to the attempt of regulating MRM is
a researchable case. Theoretically, on the one hand, ifMRM shows no importance to
aircraft technicians in the U.S ., the FAA does not have to revise it for and recommend it
to aviation world. On the other, without a regulatory foundation, the airlines are allowed
not to implement MRM in order to reduce operational cost. The competing value between
promoting safety level and reducing expenses remains sound. The rationale behind the
FAA's current non-regulatory stance should be thoroughly unveiled.
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Overview
A new upper-level aviation course at the University of Nebraska at Omaha resulted from
the application of research in the area of safety, disaster preparedness, and emergency response.
The course, Airport Safety and Security, was conceived following the crash of TWA 800 and the
subsequent White House Commission and the growing awareness of emergency planning and
disaster response in aviation. The course was developed utilizing research into curriculum needs
in this area, including discussions with industry and government experts. The results of this
research revealed components for inclusion, such as airport and ramp safety, OSHA requirements,
risk assessment and management, disaster preparedness, emergency response plans, coordination
among authorities, crisis communication, and passenger rights. The research also revealed that
the structure of such a course lends itself to a seminar format and required many areas of
expertise. The result is a comprehensive curriculum design which provides a model for ready
implementation in collegiate aviation education programs.

Introduction
Curriculum development can be achieved through the application of the research model.
A new upper-level aviation course at the University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO) followed such
a plan. The course, Airport Safety and Security, was conceived following the crash of TWA 800
and the subsequent White House Commission, as well as the growing awareness of emergency
planning and disaster response in aviation. The course was developed utilizing research into the
curriculum needs in this area, including discussions with industry and government experts. The
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results of this research revealed components for inclusion, such as airport and ramp safety, OSHA
requirements, risk assessment and management, disaster preparedness, emergency response plans,
coordination among authorities, crisis communication, and passenger rights. The research also
revealed that the structure of such a course lends itself to a seminar format and required many
areas of expertise.
The course which was developed is described in detail in this white paper. This course,
Airport Safety and Security, is offered at the University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO) as Aviation
4086/8086. The seminar format is well-suited to graduate students as well as undergraduate
students.

Course Description
This course was designed to allow the students to explore the role of airports in relation to
safety and security. Topics of the course include regulations, responsibilities, security issues,
ramp safety, disaster preparedness, and emergency management. The course is intended for all
students interested in aviation, however the prerequisites for this course specifY junior standing
and completion of the aviation introductory course. Due to the availability of government
documents on-line, students are required to have access to and a working knowledge of the
World Wide Web.
Important to a course on aviation security, it is made explicitly clear to students that under

no circumstance are students to attempt infiltration of aviation security, as this is a violation of
federal law.

Content and Organization

30

Schaaf & Bowen

4

The introduction to this course will include the course objectives and overview, concepts,
and terms. The importance of airport safety and security in the aviation industry will be
discussed, as well as the uniqueness of aviation compared to other industries.
The topic of airport security will involve the study of security regulations for the U.S. and
international community. Government, airports and airlines security responsibilities will be
covered, along with physical security equipment requirements. Historical perspectives and the
future outlook of terrorism in aviation will be studied. Recent security issues such as disruptive
passengers, baggage match, passenger profiles, certification of security companies, and
background checks will be explored. The section on dangerous goods will include explosives.
bomb detection equipment, K-9 units, and hazardous materials. Aviation law enforcement and
internal security for the airlines will be explored in terms of prevention strategies.
Airport Safety will include ramp safety, OSHA, risk assessment and management.
Disaster preparedness will accommodate aviation emergency management; emergency
response plans; coordination among government, airports, airlines, and non-profit authorities;
crisis communication; and passenger rights, which will entail the Red Cross and the NTSB Family
Assistance Act.

Objectives
The course objectives were established for students based upon the practical applications
of the course material. Upon completion of the course, the student should be able to:

•

Differentiate between airport and airline responsibilities in safety and security.
Outline and explain the appropriate regulations governing airport safety and
security.
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Trace the evolution of aviation security in terms of the unique threat to aviation.
Evaluate appropriate methods for securing airports.
Develop a safety plan for an airline station at an airport.
Develop an emergency response plan for an airport including federal requirements.
Identify the essential organizations available to respond to airport emergencies.

Methodology
Students will learn course material through various means. First, the written
communication component will incorporate a final essay exam and other written assignments.
The oral communication component includes in-class presentations, group exercises, and class
participation. The computer and technology component includes word processing, e-mail, web
assignments, library database searching, and education technology presentations to the class.
Since all assignments must be typed, students are encouraged to use the UNO computer labs for
computer applications. The international component includes aviation security issues which affect
U.S. airlines overseas. The research component consists of the course project or paper.
Additionally, various teaching methodologies will be used in administering the course.
The course will be delivered through in-class lectures, guided discussions, on-line demonstrations,
guest speakers, and media-oriented presentations. The instructor will stimulate thinking, provide
enthusiasm, be responsive to students, be well prepared for class, and explain and clarifY subject
material. The instructor will grade fairly, clarify subject material, and be available to students for
office hours.

Evaluation
As the class is offered to both graduates and undergraduates, differing evaluation

mechanisms were established. The undergraduate final exam will consist of essay and short
answer questions which will be comprehensive in nature. Undergraduate students will prepare
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three article critiques over the assigned articles. Each critique will be I 'h - 2 double-spaced typed
pages. The critiques will require students to analyze information in the article, not summarize it.
They will be evaluated on their ability to incorporate other course materials in the analysis to
strengthen the critiques. Students will present the critiques to the class and lead a discussion.
The final course grade for undergraduate students will be based on the following point scale:

Undergraduate Final Exam
Article Critiques (3 at 100 each)
Participation
Total Points

400
300

.lQQ
800

The graduate final essay exam will be comprehensive in nature. It will cover all course
material, including graduate reading for the course paper. Graduate students will prepare a
research paper on a topic selected from the content outline in this syllabus. Students will utilize a
research methodology, such as content analysis, to conduct the research study. In the instance
that a student works in the field, students may instead negotiate a project related to their job and
the course material to be approved by the course instructor. The final course grade for graduate
students will be based on the following point scale:
Graduate Final Comprehensive Essay Exam
Course Paper/Project
Participation
Total Points

400
300
I 00
800

Class participation is required of alJ students and may consist of announced or
unannounced quizzes, attendance, participation in class discussions and exercises, or any
combination of these. A subjective evaluation by the instructor is the primary criterion of in-class
performance.
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Resource Material
Given the nature of the course material, many of the assigned readings are from
government-produced documents. Readings will be assigned from the following:
FAA Advisory Circular 150/5200-18B Airport Safety Self-Inspection
FAA Advisory Circular 150/5200-3 I A Airport Emergency Plan
National Transportation Safety Board. ( 1999). Federal family assistance plan for
aviatio11 disasters. Washington, DC : Author.
http://www .ntsb.g.ov/publictn/2000/spcOOO l .htm

•

Federal Aviation Regulation Parts 107, 108, 109, 139, 191
http://www faa ~ov/avr/AFS/F ARS/tar-1 07.txt
http ://www faa . ~ov/avr/ AFS/F ARS/tar-1 08.1:\:t
http://www . taa g.ov/avr/ AFS/F ARS/far-1 09txt
http://www . faa . ~ov/avr/ AFS/F ARS/far-139 txt
http://www . faa . ~ov/avr/AFS/F ARS/far-1 9 I .txt

•

Additional articles will be available in the library on reserve.

The UNO campus offers many services for students. These organizations and offices
provide students with additional resources to complete course requirements.
•

The UNO Library. Research resources including Genisys and other services. A
UNO Library guide is available specifically for locating aviation sources in the
library. Website: http://library.unomaha .edu/

•

The UNO Computer Labs. Computer and Data Communication Labs are
located throughout the UNO campus with variable hours for student convenience.
Call or visit the Help Desk at 554-DATA. located in EAB 005, for times and
locations of campus computer labs.

•

The UNO Learning Center. Provides instruction and services to assist students
in the development of skill s necessary for efl'ective academic performance and
positive adjustment to the college learning environment. Specifically provides
tutorial services. Website:hu p.//www .unomaha cdu/- wwwlc/

•

The UNO Career and Placement Office. Information on job openings and other
information for UNO students and alumni.

A current bibliography of resources for further information was established for graduate
students preparing course papers and projects, as well as for undergraduate students seeking
additional resources. Below is a selected website bibliography from the course handout.

34

Schaaf & Bowen

8

Web Sites:
FAA Civil Aviation Security
http://cas.faa.gov
Federal Aviation Regulation Parts 107, 108, 109, 139, 191
http://www.faa.gov/avr/ AFS/F ARS/far-1 07.txt
http://www.faa.gov/avr/ AFS/F ARS/far-1 08.txt
http://www.faa.gov/avr/ AFS/F ARS/far-1 09.txt
http://www.faa.gov/avr/AFS/FARS/far-139.txt
http://www.faa.gov/avr/AFS/F ARS/far-191.txt
Gore Commission Final Report to President Clinton
http :1lwww .securitymanagement .com/goreover. html
Journal of Air Transportation World Wide
http://cid.unomaha.edu/-jatww
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
http://www.dot.gov/affairs/whcoasas.htm
Concluding Curriculum Design Components

Many suggested reading materials would supplement the student's required reading and
provide graduate students with informational resources for their course paper or project. Some of
the areas in which suggested readings are provided include aviation security regulations. aerial
piracy, aviation hijackings, aerial sabotage, aviation terrorism, passenger profiling, bombs and
bombings, air rage, sky crimes, airport safety self-inspection, airport emergency plans,
occupational safety and health management, safety management, organizational learning from
accidents, aviation security from an integrated system approach. crisis management, airline
passenger screening, explosive detection systems, family assistance plan, international aviation
security, crisis communication, baggage reconciliation, and security training.
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Abstract
The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute's commitment to the provision
of a sati! learning environment both in the classroom and in the air has led to the creation and
adoption of an Emergency Response Checklist to be utilized in the event that a tlight student is
involved in an aircraft accident or incident. The plan came to fruition as the result of best
practices research which examined crisis management plans at several regional flight training
providers. Four Midwestern universities with aviation programs and one Air Force flying club
were polled regarding current crisis procedures. At ttie time of the initial study, only one of the
flight training providers possessed a crisis response plan. This plan outlines the roles of the flight
vendor, as well as those of University of Nebraska at Omaha Campus Security, Student Affairs,
University Relations, and the Aviation Institute. The goal of this plan is to eliminate uncertainty
and assure that emergencies arc responded to in an efficient manner with a clear and open flow of
communication among all designated channels. As a result of this study, the Aviation Institute
has implemented its own Emergency Response Checklist with all applicable university channels
and contracted flight vendors. The outline of the checklist will be provided for review, comment
and potential adoption by collegiate aviation flight training programs.
Introduction
Preparedness is crucial for proper response to crises. "An organization in crisis must be
visible, show concern. and compassion, and demonstrate efforts to correct the problem to ensure
similar tragedies do not occur" (Ray, 1999, p. 95). This advice, provided in Strategic
~ornmunication in Crisis Management : Lessons Learned from the Airli ne Ind ustry. is applicable
not solely to the airlines. but to all facets of aviation, including the flight student training
environment. A plan must be instated to combat crises should the situation arise that a student is
involved in an accident or incident. Crises are characterized by "surprise, threat , insuflicient
information, time pressures, a lack of control, stress and anxiety, and relational changes and
tensions among participants" (p. 96). Implementation of a crisis management plan allows the
focus to be placed on the situation at hand.
According to Rebecca Luttc, Aviation Safety and Human Factors Instructor at the
University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute (UN0!\1), "It's a question of when, which
type, and how a crisis will occur. You can't wait" (personal communication, July 27, 1999). In
the event of an emergency situation, abstruseness must be avoided . Ray states, "As the level of
uncertainty decreases, decision makers are in a stronger position to identify fitting responses"
( 1999, p. 97). By raising the level of control an organization has over the situation, internal and
l~ xtcrnal conflicts arc minimized .
The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute's Emergency Response
Checklist involves the interaction and cooperation of various companies and departments.
According to Ray:
Various parties who are basically unfamiliar with one another must learn to adapt and
relate. Different goals, perspectives, interests, and responses make thi s a challenge and it
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is most likely easier said than done. When groups involved act independently and fail to
integrate their action plans. conflict is likely to occur. ( 1999, p. I 00)
Therefore, all parties involved in gathering information and notification procedures arc provided
a detailed document outlining the exact responsibilities and expectations of each company or
department.
The UNO Aviation Institute's Student Handbook declares that one ofthe clements of the
UNOAI is to provide "a comprehensive flight training program" (p. 3). By creating the
Emergency Response Checklist, the University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute
demonstrates its desire to have a positive organizational culture . According to Ray , "There is a
reciprocal relationship between organizational culture and communication. An organization's
culture is created through communication. Communication, in turn, is influenced by an
organ ization's culture" ( 1999, p. 39). The UN OJ\1 has carefully selected its flight vendors and
req uires that all shore UNOtd's commi tment to safety .
Gary Brown. Di rector of Disaster Services for Woodbury County, Iowa, including Sioux
ity C1atcway Airport, em phasized the need for a crisis plan. Brown advises that, in the event of
any emergency, one should: "Think about every decision you're making .. . Keep track of all
times ami have a scribe" report all events (personal communication, July 29, 1999). Brown also
emphasized the benefits of management research : "We learned from a lot of other people's
disasters." A crisis plan is "not only a tool which enables the organization to manage the crisis,
but .. . it further communicates a general mood a111d set of actions by management" (Ray, 1999,
p. 44).
According to Chris White, Vice President of Safety and Regulatory Compliance for
Midwest Express and Skyway Airlines, following an accident or incident it is crucial "to provide
an environment where survivors, survivors' families, and victims ' families have the bcst
opportunity to begin the healing process" (personal communication, July 29, 1999). The same
goals and commitment may be mirrored at the university level or in the flight training
environment.
Method
The authors conducted best practices research to examine crisis management plans at
several regional flight training providers. Four Midwestern universities with aviation programs
and one local flight club were contacted by either phone, e-mail or both methods by the author.
Oklahoma State University, Stillwater; Southeast Oklahoma, Durant ; Central Missouri State
University, Warrensburg; and the Offutt Aero Club, Bellevue stated that currently no written
emergency plan is on record.
The University of North Dakota, School of Aerospace was the only program to uave a
detailed crisis management plan available. Deemed a "pre-accident plan," the handbook stresses
commitment to safety: "It is the first duty of administration, management, faculty, supervisors,
instructors, maintenance, line personnel, and all others to provide for safety in operations under
thl~ir control!" ( 1998, cover).
Realizing the need for contingency and pre-crisis planning and the lack of such plans
currently available, the University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute developed a plan
based upon feedback and recommendations from members of the industry and those involved in
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aircmfl accid~nt investigution. This scheme is intended In prepare all parties involved if a
University of' Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute llight student is involved in an al~cidcnt or
incident.
Resulting Plan

The University c~(Nebraska at Omaha Aviation lnstitut<' /;light 7i·aining Fmergc•m:v
Response Checklist: Fundamental Pre-Crisis Planning is a plan intended for implementation at
all three designated UNOAI flight vendors: Hangar One, Inc ., Millard Airport; the OITutt Aero
Club, Offutt Air Force Base; and TAC Air, Omaha Fppley Airfield . The tJNO A vial ion lnstitull'
will also involve the following departments at the University : Campus Senarity, llniversity
Relations, Student Services, the Department of Public Administration, and till' ('ollegt• of Public
Affairs and Community Service.
According to Larry Craig, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Flight Standards
District Office Safety Program Manager, it is essential that all flight students file u flight plan.
Information therein will reveal the color and tail number of the downed aircraft as well as the
name and telephone number of the aircraft home base.
As soon as there is the first indication of an aircraft accident or incident, the Fedl~ral
Aviation Administration must be contacted. A call to Flight Service will result in the direct
notification of the on-call Federal Aviation Administration orticial. According to a telephone
conversation with Mr. Craig ( 1999, July 14), "Once we (the investigators) arc on-site, you
(UNO AI and its affiliates) arc out of the picture. It is no longer your aircraft . As details unfold,
we will notify next of kin." Craig added that flight vendors and/or the university may provide
assistance in locating contact information for a victim's next of kin .
Emergency management, fire departments, and law enforcement oflkers arc advised to
follow a plan of action developed by the Flight Standards District Office . These agencies arc
advised to "not disturb or move the wreckage except to the !extent! necessary : to remove persons
injured or trapped; to protect the wreckage from further damage; or to protect the public from
injury" (Nebraska FSDO, 1999, p. I).
Photographs of the scene must be taken, a wreckage diagram must he constructed, and the
wreckage site must be preserved and secured until the aircraft is released to the National
Transportation Safety Board/Federal Aviation Administration. liNOAI llight vendors may assist
local authorities in this process. Additionally, the FSDO report advises on commenting ltl the
media: "Treat the press as you would at any accident site. Advise them that lcdcral investigators
arc on the way and further information may be obtained from them" (p. 2).
Together, the flight vendor must work with all authorities and related parties to ensure
that the rt:sponsc and subsequent investigation is handled properly. The following checklist
includes FAA/NTSB procedures which arc utilized at the University of North Dakota ( ll)9H, p.
9) and may be emulated, in part, within the lJNOAI 1-:mcrgent~y Response Checklist :
I. Site description
2. Photographs
3. {t1dividual) flight records reviewed
4 . Aircraft maintemnct: records
5. Accident/Incident/Occurrence checklist complete
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6. Individual drug tl'St n.:sults
7. Interview cycwitncss(cs)
It Interview person(s) involved in mishap
9. NTSB/FAA reports suhmittcd
I 0. In-house Report completed
II. Insurance Report suhmitted
Meanwhile, the local night vendor will contact the FAA, lJNO Aviation lnstitutl\ and
UNO Campus Security. Mr. Kosel or Mr. Mmton will he notified immediately. l ~ ithcr Mr. Kosel
or Mr. Murton will then contact University Relations and Student Services, as required hy
Section 2.2. of the UNO I landhook. Campus Security will ontain as much inlimnation as
possible from the flight wndor, local agency, or accident investigator and construct a detailed log
of all communication and times when the communication took place. Campus Security will
verify with the !light vendor that all local and tcderal authorities, including Flight ScrviCl.' and thc
Federal Aviation Administration Regional Operations Center. (H 16)426-4600, have heen
contacted. Additionally, Campus Security will refrain from making public comment to the media,
forwarding all requests to University Relations.
The UNO AI will adhere to the ''Protocol Concerning the Off-Campus Death of a
Student" provided by Dr. Mary Mudd, Vice Cham:ellor of Student Affairs ( 1999, June 9). In the
event of a fatality of a currently-enrolled aviation student, the following guide Iines wi II hl·
followed.
I. Notice that the Student has died is reported by Cumpus Sl·curity (Mr. Kosel or Mr.
Morton) to the Office of the Vice Ch<mccllor f(u Student Afli1irs.
2. The Vice Chancellor's staff' will confirm the..~ death. Dr. Rita I knry will confirm with
University Relations.
3. Instructors will he contacted and asked if they would Iike someone from Counseling
Services to speak at, or attend the first class after the student's death .
4. Student Affairs stafTwill notify the Registrar's Office so that a notation nwy be made
in the student's file.
5. A letter signed by the Vice Chancellor ofStudl~nt Affairs will he Sl~nlto till' f~unily on
behalf of the University.
6. University Relations will he notified so that campus flags may he lowen:d on the day or
the student's funeral.
University Relations will he responsible l(n responding to requests for inf(Jrmation by thl·
media. All communications must be coordinated with the FAA prior to delivering any and all
comments. According to Ray:
While a crisis plan eliminates some of the confusion and controls many of' the dirtic..:ultil·s
associated with crisis, it rarely prepares the organization for the constant media assault,
the emotional impact of the event, and damaging ini(Jrmation and headlines which
threaten the organization's survival. (1999, p. 103)
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Thcrcl(m:, University Relations will immediately contact the Aviation lnstitutl' l>in:dor and
Flight Training Coordinator to notify of the situation at hand. Aviation lnstitutl~ pcrsonnl·l will
subsequently noli fy the Department of Public Administration (~hair and the I kan of thl~ ( 'olkge
of Public Affairs and Community Service.
The lead spokesperson, Assistant Director l(>r Communications ami Media. Thl'resa
Gleason, will obtain as much information as possible from Campus Security, while maintaining a
detailed log of all communication and times when the communication took place. Additionally,
University Relations (Ms. (!Ieason) should verify that all local and federal authorities, induding
Flight Service and the Federal Aviation Administration Regional Operations Center haw been
contacted. Essentially, University Relations will act as the UNOAI's voice during an accident or
incident. providing comments, interviews, updates, and referrals to federal investigators to the
media
Discussion
The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute has developed a program of
preparedness in the event that a flight student is involved in an accident or serious incident.
Although LJNOAI has been fortunate to not have experienced an accident or serious incident to
date, the adoption of a proactive, positive, pre-accident plan is necessary in thl· event that disaster
strikes. Other universities and tlight training centers will have the ahility to IK·ncfit fi·orn the
premise of the checklist. This plan (provided in the accompanying appendix) will he
continuously evaluated and updated in order to ensure that every step is taken to provide an allinclusive, consistent plan of action .
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Foreword

The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute is committed to providing its
students a quality education . A key element of the University's program is the provision
of a safe learning environment both in the classroom and in the air. Therefore, the
University is adopting an Emergency Notification/ Response Checklist for use in the
event that a University flight student is involved in an aircraft accident or incident. This
plan outlines the roles of the flight vendor, as well as University of Nebraska at Omaha
Campus Security, Student Affairs, University Relations. and the Aviation Institute. The
goal of this plan is to eliminate uncertainty and assure that emergencies are responded
to in an efficient manner with a clear and open flow of communication among all
designated parties .
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The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute, Flight Training
Notification/Emergency Response Plan

This plan is intended to be implemented at the four designated University of Nebraska
at Omaha Aviation Institute (UNOAI) flight vendors: Advanced Air, Inc., Council Bluffs
Airport; Hangar One, Inc., Millard Airport; the Offutt Aero Club, Offutt Air Force Base;
and TAC Air, Omaha Eppley Airfield. This plan also involves the following departments
at the University: Campus Security, University Affairs. Student Services, the College· of
Public Affairs and Community Service, the Department of Public Administration, and the
Aviation Institute.

All Aviation Institute flight students are expected to file and activate FAA flight
plans for all cross country flights. All flights will be monitored by the student's flight
instructor or a designated official of the Flight School.
The Federal Aviation Administration is to be contacted by the appropriate
authorities in the event of an aircraft accident or incident. In the event of injury or
fatality to a UNO student, Federal Aviation Administration officials will notify next of kin .
The affected Flight Vendor and/or the University will provide assistance in locating
contact information for next of kin.
The initial major concern of the University will be the media requests for
information and comments . One of the purposes of this plan is to specify the University
Affairs Office as the University's sole point of contact for media inquiries. Refer all
media information requests to the Lincoln Flight Standards District office and/or
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University Affairs Office . If asked by the media or anyone not specified in this
Emergency Response Checklist to provide additional information or personal opinions
. advise them that "the incident is being investigated by the Federal Aviation
Administration and further information may be obtained from them." The UNO student
contracts directly with the flight vendor for his/her flight training, and, therefore, the flight
vendor must work directly with all authorities and related parties to ensure that the
response and subsequent FAA investigation is handled properly.
Specifically, in the event an UNOAI flight student is involved in an accident or
incident, the local flight vendor will contact: (1) Federal Aviation Administration (2)
UNOAI representative and (3) UNO Campus Security. Campus Security will in turn
contact Mr. Kosel or Mr. Morton as soon as possible. Either Mr. Kosel or Mr. Morton will
then contact University Relations and Student Services, as required by Section 2.2. of
the UNO Handbook. Campus Security will obtain as much information as possible from
the flight vendor, local agency, or accident investigator and construct a detailed log of
all communication and times when the communication took place. A UNO Aviation
Institute representative and Campus Security will monitor and verify the steps outlined
in this Emergency Response Checklist are being accomplished in a timely fashion.
Campus Security and the UNOAI representative will refrain from making public
comment to the media or anyone else not specified in this Emergency Response
Checklist. forwarding all requests to the Federal Aviation Administration and/or
University Affairs Office.
The UNOAI will adhere to the "Protocol Concerning the Off-Campus Injury/Death
of a Student" provided by Dr. Mary Mudd, Vice Chancellor of Student Affairs (1999,
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June 9). In the event that a currently-enrolled aviation student has died, the following
guidelines will be followed.
1.

Notice that the Student has died is reported by Campus Security (Mr.
Kosel or Mr. Morton) to the Office of the Vice Chancellor for Student
Affairs.

2.

The Student Affairs Vice Chancellor's staff will confirm the death with
University Affairs.

3.

Instructors will be contacted and asked if they would like someone from
Counseling Services to speak at, or attend the first class after the
student's death.

4.

Student Affairs staff will notify the Registrar's Office so that a notation may
be made in the student's file.

5.

A letter signed by the Vice Chancellor of Student Affairs will be sent to the
family on behalf of the University.

6.

University Affairs will be notified so that campus flags may be lowered on
the day of thE student's funeral.

University Affairs will be responsible for responding to requests for information by
the media. All communications must be coordinated with the FAA prior to delivering
any and all comments.
While a crisis plan eliminates some of the confusion and controls many of the
difficulties associated with crisis, it rarely prepares the organization for the
constant media assault, the emotional impact of the event, and damaging
information and headlines which threaten the organization's suNival.
University Affairs will establish and maintain

cort;~munications

with the Aviation

Institute Director and/or Flight Training Coordinator to provide a unified and
collaborative effort.
Essentially, University Affairs will act as the UNO and Aviation Institute voice
during an accident or incident, providing comments, inteNiews, updates, and
FAAJNTSB referrals to the media.
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UNOAI personnel will update the Department of Public Administration Chair and
the Dean of the College of Public Affairs and Community Service

Appendix A: Contact Names and Information
(last updated 12 April, 2001)
Note: These numbers are to be considered confidential information of the UNO Aviation
Institute, and are not to be used, disclosed, or reproduced, in whole or in part. without
the express consent of the University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute.

UNOAI Flight Training Vendors
Mr. Jack Jackson; Hangar One, Millard Airport
12916 Millard Airport Plaza: Omaha, NE 68137 ........... .
Mr. Web Bell; Offutt Aero Club, Offutt AFB
P.O. Box 13234; OffuttAFB, NE 68113-0234 . . ........... .
Mr. Roy Timm; TAC Air, Omaha Eppley Airfield
3737 Orville Plaza; Omaha, NE 68110 ............. . ..... .
Mr. Dan Smith: Advanced Air, Inc., Council Bluffs Airport .

UNO Campus Contacts
Campus Security.. . .. .. . . . ... ... . . . . . ... . ...... . ........ .
Mr. Paul Kosel, home . . .. .. . .................. . . . .... .
-ORMr. Chester Morton, home..... . ....... . ........ . ..... .
Univers ity Relations . .. . . . . .... . .......................... .
Ms. Theresa Gleason . Asst. Dir., Comm. & Media.......... .
Student Services . . ... ..... . ... . . .. ... ............. ... .... .
Or. Mary Mudd, Vice Chancellor. home............... ... .
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UNO Aviatio n Institute , Departmental Contacts
Dr. Michael K. Larson ...... . .......... . . . .......... ...... .
Pager.. . ......................................... .
Cell. . . .......... ... ........................... .
Home. . . .. ... . .. ..... .. . ........ . . . ... ..... ... . .
E-mail. ........... ..... ......... . ...... .
Dr. Brent Bowen, Director ............. .... .... ....... . .... .
Cell (use both page & voice mail features) ................ .
Home..... ........... ............ ..... .. . .... ... .. .
E-mail. .. . ....... .
Mr. Denny Acheson, Senior Comm. Service Assoc.......... .. . . .
Home............... ... .... ... ..... . ..... ... .... .. .
Department of Public Administration ........... ..... ...... .. .
Dr Russell L. Smith, Chair, home ........... ...... . . .. .. .
Colleg e of Public Affairs and Community Service ... . .......... .
Or. B.J. Reed , Dean. home
Local/Federal Authorities
Flight Service Station, Columbus, NE . . ........... ...... .. (800) 992-7433
FAA Central Region Operations Center , Kansas City, MO.... (816) 426-4600
Local Authorities/Rescue ..... .. ... ....... .. .... .... ...... ...... 911

February 2001
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Dear Flight Vendor:
The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute (UNOAI) is dedicated to
providing a safe flight environment for its students . As a designated flight vendor for the
UNOAI, your company has been selected to train our students to become safe,
responsible aviators.
The UNOAI has recently r:dopted an Emergency Response Checklist (ERC) which we
ask you use in the event that one of our students is involved in an aircraft accident or
incident. As a UNO designated flight vendor, your primary responsibilities include the
following:

+

+

Monitor all UNO student fliQht traininQ. Efforts to locate a student will be
initiated when a solo/dual flight is overdue by over 30 minutes.
Require students to file a flight plan with FAA Flight Service for all cross
country flights.

+

Maintain a current student file which includes contact information for next
of kin .

+

Contact the appropriate local and federal authorities, including Flight
Service [(800) 992-7433] and the Federal Aviation Administration
Regional Operations Center [(816) 426-4600), in the event of an accident
or incident.
Contact a UNO Aviation Institute representative and Campus Security (24hour availability) at the University of Nebraska at Omaha (see list).
1) Inform UNOAI and Campus Security that an UNO Aviation
h1stitute student has been involved in an accident/incident.
2) Indicate whether the Federal Aviation Administration authorities
have been notified or not.

+

Obtain as much information as possible regarding the accident/incident,
including weather conditions at the site and time, aircraft maintenance log,
and arrange for drug/alcohol testing, if required .

+

Refrain from making public comment to the media or anyone else
not specified on this Emergency Response Checklist, including all
employees . Forward all questions to the appropriate federal authorities.

+

Train all staff regarding the procedures of the ERC, maintain a current
copy of the ERC where it can be readily found, and provide all staff with
updates to the ERC when issued by UNOAI.
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The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute thanks you for your cooperation
in this matter. Please contact me at 554-3424 should you have any questions regarding
our Emergency Response Checklist.
Sincerely,

Michael K. Larson
En c.
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Dear Mr. Kosel and Mr. Morton:
The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute (UNOAI) is dedicated to providing
a safe flight environment for its students. Campus Security plays an important role in this
mission.
The UNOAI has recently adopted an Emergency Response Checklist (ERC) which we ask
you use in the event that one of our students is involved in an aircraft accident or incident.
Upon notification (from any source) that an UNO Aviation student is involved:

+

Contact University Affairs, 554-2358. and Student Services. 554-2779, as
required by Section 2.2 of the UNO Handbook.

+

Obtain as much information as possible from the flight vendor, loc:al agency,
or accident investigator who has notified you.

+

Maintain a detailed log of all communication and times when the
communication took place.

+

Refrain from making public comment to the media, or anyone else not
specified on this Emergency Response Checklist, including all
employees. Forward all questions to University Affairs, 554-2358, or to
federal authorities.

The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute thanks you for your cooperation
in this matter. Please contact me at 554-3424 should you have any questions regarding
our Emergency Response Checklist. You will be provided periodic updates. should the
above stated information be amended.
Sincerely,

Michael K. Larson
En c.
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Dear Or. Mudd :
The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute (UNOAI) is dedicated to providing
a safe flight environment for its students . UNO Student Services plays an important role
in this mission.
The UNOAI has recently adopted an Emergency Response Checklist which is to be strictly
adhered to in the event that one of our flight students is involved in an accident or incident
Should an emergency arise, you will be notified immediately by UNO Campus Security.
UNO Student Services will be called upon to fulfill the foliowing roles, as outlined in UNO's
"Protocol Concerning the Off~Campug Death of a Student":

+

Confirmation of fatalities/injuries . Confirm with University Affairs that student
is from UNO and is a flight student.

+

Contact university instructors, asking is they would like someone from
Counseling Services to speak at, or attend the first class following the
student's death/serious injury.

+

In the event of a student death, notify the Office of the Registrar, so that a
notation may be made in the student's file.

+
+

+

Mailing of a letter to the next of kin, signed by the Vice Chancellor of Student
Affairs, on behalf of the University.
Notification to University Affairs so that campus flags may be lowered on the
day of the student's funeral.
Additionally, in the event that a student is severely injured, appropriate
communications with University Affairs and the authorities should take place .

The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute thanks you for your cooperation
in this matter. Please contact me at 554-3424 should you have any questions regarding
our Emergency Response Checklist. You will be provided periodic updates, should the
above stated information be amended .
Sincerely,

Michael K. Larson
En c .
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February, 2001
Dear Ms. Gleason :
The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute (UNOAI) is dedicated to providing
a safe flight environment for its students . UNO University Affairs plays an important role
in this mission.
The UNOAI has recently adopted an Emergency Response Checklist (ERC) which we ask
you to follow in the event that one of our flight students is involved in an accident or
incident. In this event, you will be notified by Campus Security. UNO University Affairs'
primary responsibilities will include the following:

+

Immediately contact and maintain communications with the Aviation Institute
Director and/or Flight Training Coordinator to coordinate efforts.

+
+

Obtain as much information as possible from Campus Security.

+

Verify that all federal authorities, including Flight Service [(800) 992-7 433]
and the Federal Aviation Administration Regional Operations Center [(816)
426-4600] have been contacted.

+

Verify that the student is from UNO and is enrolled in flight training . Obtain
these facts from Dr. Brent Bowen or Mike Larson [554-3424] at the Aviation
Institute or through Dr. Mudd's office, UNO Student Services [554-2779].

+

Provide comments, interviews and updates to the media. Please note that
you may refer the media to federal investigators for information regarding the
accident/incident.

+

In the event of a student's death, communicate with UNO Student Services
to ensure that campus flags are lowered on the day of the student's funeral.

Maintain a detailed log of all communication and times when each
communication took place.

The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute thanks you for your cooperation
in this matter. Please contact me at 554-3424 should you have any questions regarding
our Emergency Response Checklist. You will be provided periodic updates, should the
above stated information be amended.
Sincerely,

Michael K. Larson
En c.
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